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This research report seeks to shed more light on the current flow of Syrian asylum seekers to Europe. 
Since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, it is estimated that millions of people have fled their homes. 
As of October 2015, 700,000 of them have declared asylum in the European Union. Although most 
European states that are receiving Syrian refugees have signed and ratified the 1951 Convention, it is a 
challenge to guarantee refugees’ basic rights: given the lack of money, the lack of an infrastructure to 
manage large and sudden influxes; and, above all, unclear political strategies. The flawed response is 
also generated by a failure to understand the factors that are leading Syrian families to make such a 
dangerous journey to Europe, factors that push them to waste all their savings and jump on boats 
leading them to unknown lands. Indeed, despite the high political and humanitarian interest around 
growing global migration levels, there are very few systems in place to monitor the migration flows, 
especially in the Middle East and towards Europe. Our knowledge of irregular migration is often 
plagued with fragmented perspectives on the socio-cultural dynamics of the journey, the smuggler-
traveller relationship and their community dimensions. Moreover, there is no exhaustive data 
collection to support humanitarian organization programmes in terms of easing the movement of 
refugees, safely and with dignity. The lack of systematic investigation of migration in Europe and in 
the Middle East generates fears and misconceptions among the population at large; while, in order to 
respond effectively to the emergency, more evidence-based knowledge is urgently needed to share as 
widely as possible. The present report aims at filling this information gap through systematic and 
participatory data collection exercises. It reports data and information from Syrian refugees in Jordan 
and Lebanon about push and pull factors, protection risks and threats, and the availability of 
information before and during their journey across the Balkans.  
Key words: Syrian refugees, Europe, irregular migration, humanitarian organizations, Middle East, 
Balkans 
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1. Introduction 
The context  
Since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, it is estimated that millions of people have fled their homes. 
Deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure; the killing and maiming of civilians; armed attacks on 
schools and hospitals; a complete lack of access to the most basic services, including food and water, 
have forced millions of Syrians to seek refuge outside their country of origin. A bleak scenario plays 
out against the backdrop of a Europe allegedly crumbling under the sheer weight of refugees. The 
Syrian exodus has generated a real state of emergency in Europe during the last few weeks, with 
public opinion confused and terrified by pathetic photos of corpses lying on the shores and aggressive 
strangers trying to push through Europe’s security walls. At the time of writing, Hungary has declared 
a state of emergency, leaving thousands of asylum seekers (most of them Syrians) stranded on its 
border with Serbia.
1
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has reiterated its 
call for a robust and coherent European response to the current refugee crisis, but expressed deep 
disappointment that European Union member states have failed to reach agreement over a wider 
relocation plan of up to 120,000 people. 
With the general hysteria about the risks posed by Syrian refugees, public opinion has forgotten 
that only 700,000 of them declared asylum in the European Union from the beginning of the crisis to 
October 2015 (UNHCR 2015; see figure 1). On the other hand, according to UNHCR, there are over 
7.5 million internally displaced (IDPs) and almost 4.5 million have fled to Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and 
Jordan (UNHCR 2015). 
Figure 1. Asylum Applicants in the EU28 by nationality – Top 10 countries 2010-2015  
(monthly flows)  
 
Source: Fargues 2015. 
                                                     
1
 In the current report, Syrians travelling to the EU are often referred to as both “refugees” and “asylum seekers”. 
Each term, of course, has a distinct meaning that carries different international obligations and consequences. 
The use of the two terms in the document is explained by the ambiguous situation of Syrians. The vast 
majority of Syrians who left Syria after the outbreak of the conflict in 2011 and who entered Jordan and 
Lebanon were registered with UNHCR in the respective countries. However, since their status has not yet 
been definitively determined in Europe, these people are still asylum seekers while journeying to Europe. 
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However, the available services within the hosting communities have grown thinner and the hosting 
communities have raised serious concerns over the availability of already limited resources: Jordan is 
concerned about the chronic lack of safe drinkable water, for instance. As a response to this prolonged 
crisis, neighbouring countries have adopted harsher polices towards refugees, by periodically closing 
their borders; limiting access to employment, as well as to health and educational facilities. In the 
meantime, international donors are running out of funds and humanitarian agencies – such as World 
Food Programme (WFP) – have dramatically decreased their assistance to Syrians, so as to further fuel 
their search for better living conditions. This situation has been a significant push factor for many 
refugee families, who have decided to move to other countries, where reception policies are more 
encouraging and asylum seekers regulations more generous. 
Although most European states that are receiving Syrian refugees have signed and ratified the 1951 
Convention, it is a challenge to guarantee refugees’ basic rights: given the lack of money, the lack of 
an infrastructure to manage large and sudden influxes; and, above all, unclear political strategies. 
Therefore, it was not surprising to watch refugees being beaten, attacked with tear gas and water 
cannons, and denied entry or legal stay. European states are failing to protect asylum seekers and 
failing to respond humanly and promptly to a massive humanitarian and political crisis. 
The flawed response is, in part, generated by a failure to understand the factors that are leading 
Syrian families to make such a dangerous journey to Europe, factors that push them to waste all their 
savings and jump on boats leading them to unknown lands. Indeed, despite the high political and 
humanitarian interest around growing global migration levels, there are very few systems in place to 
monitor the migration flows, especially in the Middle East and towards Europe. The humanitarian 
community generally does not believe that information about migration flows is collected consistently 
and, above all, in a participatory manner. As a result, our knowledge of irregular migration is often 
plagued with fragmented perspectives on the socio-cultural dynamics of the journey, the smuggler-
traveller relationship and their community dimensions. Moreover, there is no exhaustive data 
collection to support humanitarian organization programmes in terms of easing the movement of 
refugees, safely and with dignity. 
The lack of systematic investigation of migration in Europe and in the Middle East generates fears 
and misconceptions among the population at large; while, in order to respond effectively to the 
emergency, more evidence-based knowledge is urgently needed to share as widely as possible. 
The study 
The present report aims at filling this information gap through systematic and participatory data 
collection exercises. These will shed more light on the dynamics that lead refugees to travel towards 
Europe. This research study is part of an ongoing research project, which is the result of a joint 
collaboration of INTERSOS and the Migration Policy Centre (MPC), part of the larger Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute. The combination of work 
done by the lead MPC researcher, Dr Luigi Achilli, and the assistance provided by INTERSOS focal 
points and INTERSOS field staff has resulted in a fine-grained analysis.
2
 This study will provide the 
reader with a nuanced understanding of the most important aspects of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
This paper reports data and information from Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon about push and 
pull factors, protection risks and threats, and the availability of information before and during their 
journey across the Balkans. The whole analysis revolves around two overarching questions: why did 
unexpectedly surprisingly high number of Syrian refugees leave for Europe over the summer and fall of 
2015? And what types of risks and challenges does this journey pose for them? To address these issues, 
the analysis will make the journey, focusing on refugees’ departure, journey to Europe, and arrival. 
                                                     
2
 Special acknowledgment to Monica Matarazzo for her complete support of this study and assistance on the report. 
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Field research for this report was carried out in Jordan and Lebanon as well as along the Balkan 
route: i.e. Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia. As such, research at departure points is largely 
about Syrian refugees who live or lived for a certain period of time in Jordan and Lebanon. Refugees 
in Syria or in other countries of first asylum (Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt) will appear more for the 
purposes of comparison. That will help the reader get a better grasp of the specificity of the Jordanian 
and Lebanese contexts as well as appreciating shared features. The interviews of refugees, aid 
personnel, scholars and others on which this study is based were, where possible, planned in advance 
and based on a schedule of questions covering key thematic areas of interest. Obviously, the research 
objectives were flexible as the availability of individuals and key informants has at times been 
hampered by security issues as well as by their willingness to discuss potentially controversial issues. 
Single interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were adapted to the specific context and 
requirements of the research. Gender, age and diversity issues were taken into consideration by 
deploying gender-based teams in the field. In so doing, refugees were approached in full respect of 
their dignity and safety. Questions were tailored to be culturally appropriate and so do no harm, while 
still ensuring that adequate information was gathered. Finally, while open and semi-structured 
interviews and field notes remained the most important part of the research, the author devoted some 
time to participant observation: travelling with refugees and becoming part of their experience.
3
 
2. The departure 
2.1 Countries of first asylum: A deteriorating situation 
The condition of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon has got radically worse with the protraction 
of the Syrian crisis. All those interviewed confirmed how their situation has become unbearable at 
different levels – from their incapacity to find steady employment to the lack of proper health 
coverage, to the daily discriminations endured from local authorities and host-communities. A bleak 
scenario is today playing out against the ongoing Syrian crisis. 
Restrictions on freedom of movement 
The Government of Jordan and Lebanon are not signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention related to 
the status of refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Both countries deal with refugees within certain margins of 
discretion. A large majority of refugees interviewed lamented the systematic restriction on their 
movement following the recent approval of a number of regulations by the host countries. 
The Jordanian authorities have, since 2014, progressively restrained Syrian refugees’ freedom of 
movement in urban areas. Refugees used to be able to register with UNHCR no matter the status of 
their documentation. Since 14 July 2014, the government has instructed UNHCR to stop issuing 
Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASCs) to Syrian refugees that have left the camps without proper “bail 
out” documentation.4 The ASC is indispensable for obtaining Ministry of Interior (MoI) Service Cards 
for refugee access to public health care and education services in host communities. The new policy 
has consequently affected many Syrian households. Furthermore, cards need to be renewed on a yearly 
basis. The cost for renewing a MOI card is 50 JOD for each card, which makes it extremely costly for 
large households. Refugees without a valid MOI card face deportation to camps; humanitarian 
                                                     
3
 As this is not a representative sample of Syrian seeking asylum, no final conclusions should be drawn regarding 
the nature of refugees’ irregular migration to Europe. In addition, a number of issues – such as the sensitivity 
of certain information and the limited time for fieldwork – may have ultimately affected the data collection. 
However, though findings cannot be generalised, the present report provides an important insight into the 
current displacement trends of Syrian migrants to the EU. 
4
 The “bail out” is the legal process by which the Jordanian authorities grant Syrian refugees the permission to 
leave camps and holding facilities. 
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organizations have also reported several cases of refoulement back to Syria in violation of 
international obligations (SNAP 2014). 
In Lebanon, new residence renewal procedures have come into force since January 2015. These 
have introduced financial and bureaucratic obstacles to the renewal procedure and they have restricted 
the number of refugees with valid residence permits. The Lebanese government requires refugees to 
provide additional documentation, which is expensive and difficult to get. These include a housing 
pledge by the landlord/landowner that demonstrates his/her entitlement to lease the property to the 
Syrian tenant. The sponsorship system exacerbates refugees’ vulnerability to exploitation and make 
them overly dependent on humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, also those refugees interviewed in 
Lebanon reported the cost for the renewal of their residency visas (USD 200) as a great obstacle. 
Those Syrian nationals found by the authorities without proper documentation are required to leave the 
country. According to trusted sources, the Government of Lebanon has not systematically enforced 
deportation up to the present time. These new regulations, however, effectively opened the way to 
legal sanctions against the refugees, including indictment and imprisonment. 
A similar situation seems to exist in Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt. The Government of Egypt, for 
example, used to exempt Syrians from entry visas to its territory. However, entry requirements 
changed in July 2013 when the government required the procurement of a visa prior to arrival along 
with security clearance for security reasons. The same happened in Iraq where the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) drastically limited Syrians’ freedom of movement across the areas where the vast 
majority of them (97 percent) reside – namely Erbil, Suleimaniah and Duhok. Security considerations 
seems to have conditioned Turkey’s decision to introduce stricter border control procedures to restrict 
the flows of Syrian refugees over the past few years.
5
 
Limited access to services 
All Syrian refugees interviewed in Jordan and Lebanon reported the challenges of accessing basic 
services as fundamental factors in their determination to leave for Europe. The main problems were 
healthcare and education. The delivery of these services is the direct expression of the strain placed by 
refugees on host-countries and their freedom of movement. 
In Jordan, for example, public hospitals – subsided by the UN – were open to Syrian refugees for 
the first three years after the outbreak of the Syrian conflict. However, free healthcare provided to 
Syrians have overburdened the country’s capacity to maintain this service. Since July 2014, primary 
health care services are available to all registered Syrians at subsidized prices only upon the 
presentation of a Health Certificate. The certificate, however, is costly and covers only a limited range 
of health issues. As Mohammed
6
 – a refugees in his mid-thirties – explained, “if my daughter needed a 
surgical operation as happened three years ago [she has a heart issue], we would not be able to do 
anything for her as now we have to pay for this type of intervention. This is why I want to go to 
Europe; I simply cannot afford to stay in Jordan any longer”. Furthermore, restrictions on freedom of 
movement directly infringes upon these services. In both Lebanon and Jordan, valid residence permits 
are indispensable for obtaining access to public health care services in host communities. Recent 
studies in Lebanon, for example, report how a lack of proper health coverage is one of the greatest 
challenges faced by refugees with limited legal status (see, for example: NRC-IRC 2015). 
Another common problem amongst Syrians seems to be access to education. Many of the 
interviewed refugees complained that quality of education in both Jordan and Lebanon was either very 
low or inaccessible. A number of issues create barriers to refugees’ enrolment and attendance in the 
education system. These barriers range from financial constraints and restrictions on movement to 
structural weaknesses in the Lebanese and Jordanian education systems. Syrians need respectively the 
                                                     
5
 See http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/migrant-crisis/ [Accessed 4 December 2015]. 
6
 Throughout the report, the author has used fictitious names to protect the anonymity of the informants. 
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MoI card in Jordan and the Residence Visa in Lebanon to access education services. As the procedures 
to renew residency permits and regularizing their status are increasingly cumbersome and expensive, 
many refugees – especially in Lebanon – have not valid documentation and cannot access free 
education (NRC 2015; see also Amnesty International 2015). For example, UNHCR estimates that 
420,000 Syrians in Lebanon between six and fourteen years of age are in need of education services. 
Most importantly, however, growing numbers of Syrian refugees have attempted to enter the already 
saturated Lebanese and Jordanian education systems. In both countries, schools are overloaded. The 
vast majority of schools in high-density refugee areas have added extra sessions and cut class hours to 
absorb the large number of Syrian pupils in classrooms. This has inevitably led to a decline in the 
quality of educational services. 
Limited access to livelihoods 
Virtually all refugees interviewed in Jordan and Lebanon concurred that they intended to leave the 
host country because of the limited or zero access to adequate livelihoods. This is hardly surprising. 
Over the past years, Syrian refugees relied on money lent from their families and friends and those 
earned working in Jordan’s informal economy. Today, refugees have largely run out of these 
resources. 
The Lebanese Government has traditionally shown great tolerance toward the infringement of the 
norms regulating working entitlement. In 1993, Lebanon and Syria signed a bilateral agreement that 
granted freedom to stay, work, and practice economic activity for nationals of both countries. 
Nonetheless, under new regulations in Lebanon, refugees must sign a pledge not to work when 
renewing their residency status. 
All this seems to replicate a scenario already seen with Syrian refugees in Jordan and Egypt.
7
 In 
these countries, principally due to prohibitive costs and administrative obstacles, work permits for 
Syrians are not being issued. In Jordan, non-Jordanians with legal residency and valid passports can 
obtain work permits only if the prospective employer pays a fee and shows that the job requires 
experience or skills not to be found among the Jordanian population. A recent UNHCR survey reports 
that only 1% of visited refugee households had a member with a valid work permit in Jordan. 
Furthermore, according to the interviewed refugees, the Jordanian government has ceased to 
demonstrate any leniency towards those who are working in the black market (UNHCR, 2014: 28). As 
a result, interviewed refugees claimed to work mostly illegally and occasionally, on an average of five 
days a month: a level of employment that is insufficient for household expenditures. Therefore, many 
refugees are today fearful of being detained or deported because of lapsed residency visas and because 
of their involvement in illegal labour. 
Refugee families have coped with the status quo by liquidating the few assets that they were able to 
bring along with them, relying on humanitarian assistance and working, mostly illegally. However, 
these work and humanitarian “opportunities” decreased steadily through 2014 and almost disappeared 
toward the end of 2014. People have sold their personal assets in the context of their protracted 
displacement in Jordan; they have witnessed the drastic reduction of assistance within the progressive 
shrinking of the humanitarian space (Achilli 2015a); and their already meagre chances of securing a 
decent job have been curtailed even further by the restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement 
by the Jordanian authorities. 
Child labour, early marriage, restriction of movement, domestic violence as a consequence of 
increased stress, and high levels of debt are all on the rise. Overall, vulnerability is increasing, and to 
survive refugees often resort to negative coping mechanisms. An ILO study reports, for example, that 
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 See http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/migrant-crisis/ [Accessed 4 December 2015]. 
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close to half of the Syrian refugees families have one working child (ILO 2014).
8
 A previous 
UNWOMEN assessment reveals that 47% of households’ paid employment came from children 
(UNWOMEN 2013: 3). Syrian families have also been readier to give their children up to early 
marriage, a practice often resorted to by some parts of the Syrian community to ensure a better 
financial situation and a safer space for their daughters.
9
 
The pledge not to work and the limitations on obtaining working permits render Syrians dependent 
on humanitarian assistance or debt. Syrians have relied almost entirely on humanitarian aid from 
UNHCR and other NGOs. However, funding shortfalls have negatively affected humanitarian aid 
inflow in the past two years. In Lebanon, for example, humanitarian assistance is now estimated to 
barely cover 10% of registered refugees (Thibos 2014). In particular, what seemed to have pushed 
refugees to the edge, to the point of claiming to be willing to leave at any cost – even in Syria– are the 
recent cuts to the already meagre assistance provided by the WFP. In Lebanon, the WFP cut the value 
of its assistance by 50% in July 2015, providing only USD13.50 per person per month (WFP 2015a). 
In Jordan, as of September 2015, over half of urban refugees who had been receiving some food aid 
from the WFP lost their benefits.
10
 The remaining half has received only JOD 10 (USD 14), instead of 
the planned JOD 20 (USD 28), due to the ongoing funding crisis. Interviewed refugees in Jordan 
looked at the imminent suspension of the WFP assistance in urban areas as a reason for leaving the 
country (see for example, for Lebanon, REACH 2014). Also in Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, the WFP 
recently announced its decision to reduce by almost half the monthly voucher value to the vast 
majority of assisted refugees (WFP 2015b). 
Relationship with the host communities 
Growing levels of discrimination and racism – especially against the younger generations – are an 
important factor behind many refugees’ determination to leave the host-countries. Assessment findings 
suggest that in governorates accommodating large Syrian refugee populations, relations between 
Syrian refugee and host communities are strained and tend to deteriorate over time. None of the 
countries of first asylum have so far witnessed radical violence against Syrian refugees, but tensions 
between the local communities and Syrian refugees risk spiralling out of control. 
In Jordan, the massive influx of Syrians has generally been accompanied by demonstrations of 
solidarity, hospitality and tolerance towards the refugees. Family ties as well as linguistic and cultural 
relations between Syrians refugees and members of Jordanian host communities have facilitated the 
reception of Syrians in the Kingdom. However, the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis and its 
negative impact, real or perceived, on the living conditions of Jordanians has meant that Jordanians, 
who, at first, welcomed refugees, have become hostile. The belief that refugees are thriving on scarce 
local resources is widespread amongst increasingly resentful host communities. There is also the 
widespread belief among the less advantaged Jordanians that Syrian refugees prosper thanks to a 
generous international community that is fulfilling the needs of the latter while leaving the former 
stranded and without resources. There is also the pervasive and strong idea that Syrian refugee 
communities are fertile grounds for the proliferation of IS and Al Nusra Front militants. 
Likewise, Lebanese politicians and the media constantly reiterate the belief that Syrians constitute a 
security threat. This public and media discourse has led to increased attacks on Syrians in Lebanon. In 
a recent survey, 43% of Syrian refugees reported incidents with authorities or civilians: raids and 
                                                     
8
 Also, note that many studies have shown how child labour amongst Syrian refugees is a widespread 
phenomenon, which is not perceived by local communities as being inherently negative. See, for example, 
Un ponte per… 2012. 
9
 Note that Syrian refugees have also developed some positive coping strategies. One example is the relevance of 
community support as one of the main sources of income for many households. See CARE 2013. 
10
 The WFP has recently reinstated food assistance until January 2016 to those refugees who have been without 
since September 2015. See more Jordan Times 2015. 
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searches, harassment, insults, detention, beating, and extortion (Thibos 2014). Many refugees 
interviewed admitted their unwillingness to approach local authorities. Take Sarah, a woman in her 
early forties and a mother of four. The woman was living in a small Lebanese city near the road 
leading to the Masnaa crossing in the Bekaa Valley. Over the course of an interview, she complained 
about the harsh treatment that she and her oldest son had to undergo at the hands of the local 
communities. Pointing at a plasterboard covering a broken window in the sitting room of her 
dilapidated shelter, she said: “you see that window, there is no need to fix it up. We did it but they [the 
host-communities] broke it again. They don’t want us here anymore. My son is insulted and harassed 
every day in the street. They call him ‘Syrian dog’. And there is not much that he can do about it. If he 
approaches the authorities to complain, he will be the one detained because he is Syrian”.11 
2.2. Refugees’ perspectives: leave or not to leave? this is not a dilemma 
The vast majority of our informants expressed a desire to leave Jordan and Lebanon. Many of them 
saw migration to Europe as a way of escaping from their hardships in these host countries. However, 
do Syrian refugees perceive migration to the wealthier EU member states as the only solution to their 
predicament? 
If most want to leave, the destination is open to debate. Not all wanted to go to Europe; many 
showed a determination to return to Syria – despite the evident risks that a journey to that war-ravaged 
country would entail. Our informants concurred that the journey to Europe was expensive, dangerous, 
and the majority feared cultural estrangement once there: be their final destination Sweden, Germany 
or another European country. They saw these problems on the media, heard about them from those 
who had made it to Europe and extrapolated from those who vanished en route. However, while the 
dangers, costs, and cultural estrangement held some back, many others left or intend to do so. What 
ultimately triggered the decision to leave for Europe were a number of interrelated factors generally 
linked to the socio-economic status, age, and the social network of the interviewed person. However, 
other factors also emerged into the picture: ideology, expectations, and political considerations 
amongst others. 
Refugees living in big urban centres such as Amman and Beirut were generally keen to embark on 
an irregular journey to Europe. These were mostly medium-high skilled workers from Syrian urban 
areas. They believed they had the sufficient cultural capital for a westernized style of life and some 
fluency in English. Many amongst their relatives and friends were already living in Europe – generally 
in Sweden and Germany. Mahmood and his wife represent the category. They are from a well-off 
neighbourhood in Damascus; they are in their thirties and have two children. Mahmood was an 
engineer in Syria; his wife, Suhad, owned and worked in a pharmacist near their house. They left Syria 
in 2013 after a mortar shells hit and destroyed both their house and pharmacy. They headed towards 
Jordan. Jordanian authorities intercepted Mahmood and his family at the border, and took them to the 
Za’atari Camp. They spent only three hours there, for registration, and left soon after to Amman where 
Suhad’s brother moved a year earlier. “It is impossible to find a decent job in Jordan”, Mahmood 
noted and continued: “the Jordanian government asked me to provide proper documentation as an 
engineer but there is not any available since in Syria these papers got lost during the war. […] We 
filed a request for resettlement with UNHCR when we moved to Jordan – our daughter is very sick – 
but we never heard back from them. I cannot wait anymore. Next week I will leave for Europe and I 
will ask for family reunification. My wife would like me to go to Sweden where her brother just 
moved. But I think I will go to Germany, my friends told me that life there is very good”. 
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 However, not all interviewed refugees have had similar experiences. Stronger family and tribal connections 
between refugees and host communities in border towns have mitigated the mounting intolerance against 
Syrians. Most refugees interviewed in the Jordanian northern governorates of Irbid and Ajloun did not report 
any hostility from the host communities. If episodes of discrimination and racism occurred, those were 
limited to mainly young people. 
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Syrian refugees coming from rural areas generally showed a quite different attitude. Many were 
farmers and farm-workers from around Homs and Daraa with no or very little knowledge of English; 
they were often poor. The refugees’ decision to leave for Europe cannot be understood without an 
appropriate recognition of the complex demands of earning a living in a precarious economic context. 
Yet socio-economic status affected the decision to leave in a complex manner. It was not only a lack 
of means that set Syrians on a journey to Europe: these refugees may have been poorer than their 
counterparts in Amman, yet they still had something left in Syria: their lands, on which they could 
have survived if they had returned to Syria. Furthermore, they often argued that they did not want to 
go to Europe because they would never be able to integrate in a culture so different from theirs. As a 
Syrian man in his late sixties put it: “I felt lost when I first fled Syria to come to Lebanon. I don’t want 
to feel lost twice”. He was living in one of the several Informal Tented Settlements (ITSs) spread over 
Lebanese territory. The man argued that there was no future in Lebanon. He considered returning to 
Syria where life was cheaper and where he owned a house. He excluded categorically the possibility 
of moving to Europe: he was too old and too different – he claimed – to get used to Europe. 
Furthermore, he did not want his daughters to live what he perceived to be the ‘immoral’ lifestyle of 
European countries. 
Refugee social networks were a resource at different levels. Many knew what to do and where to 
go because they relied on the expertise of their relatives and friends who had already made it. If they 
had not enough money to afford to pay the smugglers, they could borrow money from their relatives 
and friends. The networks fuelled their expectations. Many refugees told me how their relatives and 
friends encouraged them to come to Europe. In a field visit to an ITS in the Beqaa Valley a refugee 
woman in her thirties, for example, told us how she knew how good Sweden was. Her friends – who 
had just moved there – had informed her about that. She claimed that she was aware of the risks of 
cultural estrangement in Europe; yet this was gradually becoming a minor issue in countries like 
Germany and Sweden: “my friends in Sweden told me that schools and public places are increasingly 
becoming accessible to pious-minded Muslims”. 
However, if social networks triggered mobility, they could at times also restrain the same. If some 
moved out, others remained. This happened especially when the prospective migrant was unwilling 
and/or unable to face a journey – for example, in the case of elderly people. The emigration process 
specifically benefits the refugee population in host-countries as remittances from their kin and friends 
in Europe have become a mainstay of the refugee economy. Rami, a man in his late 50s, who lived in 
Amman, was a case in point. He was from Homs where he had worked as a university professor of 
philosophy. Rami left the country with his wife after the regime militias occupied their house. He 
claimed that their situation in Jordan had substantially deteriorated since the outbreak of the war in 
Syria in 2011. Yet, the couple feared the dangers of an irregular journey to Europe and the fact of 
being illegal there. Rami, however, could stay in Jordan as he relied on the remittances sent 
periodically by his younger brother who had begun to work in Sweden. 
The desire to move, however, cannot simply be reduced to mere self-interest or a cost-benefit 
analysis. While refugees certainly desired to leave their host-countries, they should not be cast as free-
roaming individuals seeking to escape as soon as possible in order to pursue better economic 
conditions in Europe. We met an old woman who lost three children in Syria. She called them 
shuhada (martyrs): “they are martyrs of the revolution”, the woman claimed, “they fought against 
Bashar and died for urriye freedom)”. She said this while flipping through the pictures on her mobile: 
some showing her children carrying machine guns, others portraying them laid out in the coffin just 
before burial. She told us how she had no doubt about returning to Syria: “I am not leaving [for 
Europe]. Where do you want me to go?! I am too old to leave. But even if I were younger I would 
never do that, I would never leave my country. I am ashamed of all these shabab (young men) who 
leave for Europe. They should stay in Syria and fight for freedom, as my children did”. 
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2.3 Departure arrangements  
Refugees have ideally two options to reach Europe: one is legal, through resettlement programmes, 
family reunification, university fellowships and scholarships, training programmes, private 
sponsorships, etc. The other option is the illegal one: an exhausting and perilous journey that takes 
them across two continents and several countries. The former would be by far the safest and quickest 
route. Yet, the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to EU member states remains for the very 
large majority of them a chimera. 
With few notable exceptions, all interviewed refugees who applied for resettlement had their 
application either rejected or left pending for an indefinite lapse of time. Sharif, for example, 
concurred that European countries do not leave refugees with any other option than to take the illegal 
route to Europe. The man, the father of two, lived in a popular quarter of Amman. As Sharif’s stay in 
the Kingdom was no longer sustainable, he applied for asylum in Sweden. His application was 
rejected. He applied again, and then again. He did it three times. Sharif claimed that every attempt 
turned out to be unsuccessful. When we met him in Amman, the man was still determined to leave for 
Europe; only, he had renounced to go through formal resettlement schemes. Venting his bitterness 
against EU embassies, he burst out: “I spent three years waiting for an answer. Nothing came. I lost 
money and wasted precious time filing resettlement application forms for European embassies… Time 
that I could have used better if I made up my mind earlier”. Shrugging his shoulders, he then added: “I 
will be flying to Turkey next week. From there, I will go to Greece [through illegal channels]. They 
[European embassies] are encouraging us to go; they need the smugglers to do their job.” 
Irregular channels are expensive. Refugee families have coped with the cost of the journey by 
liquidating the few assets that they were able to bring along with them and getting into debt. This 
entails considerable protection risks: as young adult males leave for Europe, families lose an economic 
lifeline with already stranded households. 
On the other hand, the past months have witnessed a dramatic abatement of travel costs and 
journey time, which has made the whole project feasible for an increasing number of refugees. 
Interviews with asylum seekers and facilitators confirmed that the price an individual willing to travel 
from the Middle East to Germany needs to pay dropped from 8000 USD to 2000/2500 USD. When 
Mahmood – a boy in his late teens – joined his cousin in Sweden in September, 2015, a year after his 
departure, he paid around 3500 USD, approximately a third of what his cousin paid. There are several 
reasons for this fall in costs. The opening of new pathways to Europe is one of them. The Turkish-
Greek corridor has today become the refugees’ preferred alternative to the dangerous and more 
expensive Libyan route. Studies have, indeed, demonstrated how the riskier the route, the more 
expensive the price migrants have to pay for the crossing (for example: European Commission 2015). 
Furthermore, transit countries along the Western Balkan route have recently opened their borders to 
the refugee flow. This has made smugglers’ services useless over a large part of the journey and, 
ultimately, led to a substantial reduction in costs as refugees can now purchase regular plane, boat, bus 
and train tickets. 
If leaving takes place predominantly along irregular routes, the nature of the journey inevitably 
affects the composition of the migrant population. Not all refugees can afford an exhausting and 
dangerous journey to Europe. As such, Syrians travelling to the EU are predominantly young males. 
Unaccompanied elderly people, children, and women do not generally embark on such a journey. 
According to a recent report, “around half of this group reported to be unmarried, while the rest have 
family elsewhere, whom they hope will join them at a later date. Meanwhile, families represented only 
around a quarter of those arriving, mainly due to the high cost and difficulty of the journey” (REACH 
2015). This is confirmed by the refugees’ themselves who seem to have quite a good understanding of 
the risks and dangers associated with the journey, a second hand knowledge obtained by their social-
network in Europe and the news that they watch in TV. According to Saleh, for example, the real risk 
is the sea journey between Turkey and Greece. When we met him in Lebanon, in October, Saleh – a 
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father of two in his mid-thirties – was living in the Beqaa Valley and planning to travel to Europe 
alone, leaving his family behind: “I think about leaving every hour; there is not nothing here. But my 
family needs to stay here, it is too dangerous for my children: you travel with 10/15 metres rubber 
dinghy that take up to 50 people, far beyond its standard capacity”. Another man in Jordan, during a 
focus group in a refugee centre in Amman, echoed Saleh’s words: “This is no child journey, it is too 
dangerous to embark on, the sea can be rough, many people die, we see that on the news”. Most of 
men we interviewed confirmed their intention to leave alone. Their plan was to arrive at destination, 
apply for asylum, and once the refugee status is obtained, filing a request for family reunification. 
However, even though travelling remains an issue that predominantly regards young males, the 
composition of the Syrian flow is far more heterogeneous than that of other migrant groups – e.g. 
Afghans and Pakistanis (ibid.). Most importantly, we should entertain the possibility that the 
protraction of the Syrian crisis is altering the composition of the migrant population. The cost, length, 
and dangers of the journey has considerably decreased since the Balkan route became the most 
popular pathway to Europe allowing entire households to travel together. Smugglers also apply lower 
fares in the winter season in order to attract customers potentially discouraged by the rough winter 
seas between Turkey and Greece. 
Finally, young men’s migration may have paved the way for further irregular migratory waves. 
Over the course of our fieldwork, we met families that followed in the footsteps of their young male 
relatives. Acting as veritable trail-blazers, the latter monitor constantly the movement of their families 
and give them useful advice on the duration of the journey, contacts, and the permeability of the 
borders. This is the story of Ahmad. The man was in his late teens when he left Syria for Sweden in 
2012. It took this adolescent and his sixteen-year brother around four months to reach their 
destination. We met Ahmad in Turkey where he flew from Sweden to see his mother, sisters, and bride 
who were about to embark on a smuggler’s boat to Greece. He spent the few days prior their departure 
with them, instructing his family on the different legs of the journey. When his family finally departed, 
Mohammed tracked on the smugglers’ GPS his family’s journey to Greece. He left Turkey only when 
he received confirmation from his bride that they had reached Greek shores. 
3. On the move 
3.1 The journey 
Most Syrian asylum seekers come to Europe down two major routes. The central route – which is 
based out of Libya and travels across to the Italian and Maltese costs – has registered a peak of arrival 
of migrants and refugees over the last fifteen years. However, the traffic along this corridor has 
decreased significantly over the past twelve months (see figure 2). 
The second pathway is the eastern Mediterranean route through Turkey and Greece; this has 
become the most popular route for refugees and other Asian labour migrants and refugees wishing to 
access Europe via the Balkans. Already in the second quarter of 2015, the EU agency Frontex reported 
how the number of irregular migrants – mostly Syrians, Afghans, and Pakistanis – detected on the 
Western Balkan route reached unprecedented levels: “a record number of 68,178 illegal border-
crossings were reported from the EU’s external borders with Turkey, which represents an increase of 
over 380% compared with the previous quarter and more than 670% in relation to the same period of 
2014” (FRONTEX 2014). 
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Figure 2. Mediterranean sea arrivals and top-10 nationalities, 2015 (as of December 2015) 
 
Source: UNHCR 2015. 
If we have a closer look to this route, we will see that the intensification of irregular migration is 
linked in part to the escalation of the Syrian conflict and the recrudescence of political instability in 
the area that has raised the number of Syrian IDPs and refugees dramatically during 2014 and the early 
months of 2015 (see figure 3). However, this trend is not only related to political instability and 
warfare. Radical changes in transit countries’ border controls have played a major role in the dramatic 
increase of arrivals in Europe. Over the course of our research, we have witnessed a loosening of 
border controls along a major stretch of the Western Balkan route. While this has certainly saved 
countless lives by facilitating refugees’ flow to Europe, the drastic reduction of journey-time and 
travel-costs that this has entailed is likely to have had a catalysing effect on migration. 
Figure 3. Comparison of monthly Mediterranean sea arrivals 2014-2015 
 
Source: UNHCR 2015. 
All refugees interviewed in the study had travelled to Turkey or expressed the intention of doing so. 
Turkey has become a gathering point for Syrian refugees travelling from Syria and its neighbouring 
countries to Europe. While the country is an obligatory step for the majority of refugees, displacement 
patterns to Turkey largely depends on the possession of valid documentation. 
Syrians with a valid passport travel regularly to Turkey either by plane from Amman, Beirut, or 
Erbil or by boat from Tripoli in Lebanon. Flying to Istanbul, Izmir or other urban centres in Turkey is 
by far the fastest and safest solution (see figure 5). According to our informants, most of refugees 
living in the host-countries do this. The flight is relatively cheap, approximately 250 euros. Most 
Syrian refugees do not need a visa to flight to Turkey. My informants pointed out how even those 
among them who have lost or never had the passport can easily obtain one from the Syrian embassies 
in Amman and Beirut. “A year ago, this was almost impossible”, a young man from Damascus, living 
Luigi Achilli 
18 MPC RR2016/01 
in Amman, told us: “now, however, things have become much easier. It is only 200JOD if you want to 
renew the passport; and 400JOD to have a new one issued”. 
On the other hand, the large majority of Syrian IDPs, Palestinian refugees from Syria, and those 
without a valid passport embark on a longer and more dangerous journey that expose them to greater 
risks and higher costs. These people have no other option than to cross the border into Turkey 
illegally. Many of them take the inland route – via the Syrian-Turkish border near the village of 
Khirbat al-Joz in the northern Syrian governorate of Idleb; others are smuggled by boat from the 
Syrian coastal cities of Latakia and Tartus. Both routes are extremely dangerous and expensive as 
asylum seekers need to travel across areas controlled by armed groups.
12
 Studies and personal 
accounts reported many stories of exploitation and bribery. Several refugees claimed that, despite 
possessing valid documentation, they needed to pay high bribes when crossing the numerous 
roadblocks across Syrian territory. 
Once in Turkey, refugees depart on board wooden and fibreglass boats, rubber dinghies, fishing 
boats, and big cargo ships. At the time of our research, the vast majority of those interviewed indicated 
that they had reached Greece from the isolated areas near the Turkish port of Izmir and Bodrum. Here, 
smugglers arrange transportation, for around 1200 USD per person to Lesbos or the numerous Greek 
islands near the border with Syria. The proximity of the departure point with the Greek islands often 
mean a one-hour journey with a ten-metre rubber dinghy. Time and price, however, are likely to 
change according to a number of factors that range from the type of boat and number of people aboard 
to the weather condition and the relationship with the smugglers. As a refugee put it, “you can pay 
from 1000 USD to 5000 USD depending on whether you take an overcrowded rubber dinghy or an 
offshore boat”. In this context, finding the smugglers seems be the least of refugees’ problems. When 
Noor and her husband left Lebanon for Turkey, they did not have any prior knowledge of what they 
would find, who they would speak to, and what the exact route was. “It was very easy”, Noor told us 
when we met her in Srebrenica nearby the Serbia-Croatia border: “you just fly to Istanbul or any other 
Turkish city and then you go in certain neighbourhoods, everybody knows where. As soon as you step 
in the place, you will be approached by someone who knows that you are Syrian and what you are 
looking for. And you will find your smuggler or, in the worst case scenario, someone who knows the 
smuggler. There are places like that everywhere in Turkey.” Many other refugees reported how 
smugglers themselves advertised their services via internet and social media such as Facebook. 
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Figure 4. Rubber dinghies used by refugees to cross from Turkey to Lesbos (Greece) 
Lesbos (Greece), November 2015 
Source: Luigi Achilli. 
 
The vast majority of Syrians going to Europe rely on smuggling services almost exclusively for 
crossing the Turkish-Greek border. The past year saw, indeed, two diverging trends. On the one hand, 
the protraction of the Syrian conflict has increasingly made migration a costly and dangerous affair for 
refugees in Syria. On the other, transit countries’ policy vis-à-vis refugees and migrants seem to have 
veered toward a facilitation of irregular migration. As the western Balkan corridor opened up to 
irregular migration, the refugee flow across Europe was boosted dramatically. What made this 
overture possibly was the decision of transit countries such as Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia to issue 
temporary transit papers for asylum seekers and migrants crossing their territories. These permits are 
valid for a period of time that ranges from a few days to several months, depending on the issuing 
country and the migrant population. During this time, refugees are entitled to travel and to use public 
transportation. 
The knowledge of this change spread rapidly through the refugee population – mostly through 
word of mouth and social media. Refugees rushed to seize the opportunity, fearing that the favourable 
situation might change. According to Noor: “we decided to leave as soon as our relatives and friends 
informed us on how easy was for them to go to Germany. We did as they said. We paid smugglers 
only for the crossing to Greece. They took us to a small island. Once we were there, we just waited to 
be intercepted by local authorities that took us for a few days to a refugee camp. Here, they took our 
fingerprints and personal details. After the registration, they gave us a travel permit and told us that we 
were free to continue our journey to Europe. The same happened in Macedonia and Greece. This 
because these countries don’t want refugees to stay in their country, and know very well that if they 
kick us back, they will probably have to deal with us again next year”. 
It is hard to say what has decided this change. It is likely to be a combination of factors. Transit 
countries such as Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia may have realised that it was more convenient to 
channel refugees and migrants across their territories rather than leaving them stranded at the borders 
or having then roaming undocumented. If mobility and passages increased, so had the opportunities 
for these countries to control this irregular flow of people. Furthermore, social and media pressures 
have certainly played a role in the relaxing border controls across the Balkans and in the EU. Many 
commentators conceded as much when the photograph of a drowned toddler on a Turkish beach 
softened European views on the refugee crisis in the fall of 2015. Indeed, this sudden shift in transit 
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countries’ attitudes toward irregular migration would not be possible without European countries 
opening doors to asylum seekers. Last but not least, these countries may have found in the massive 
flow of people to Europe a valuable opportunity. As of October 2015, refugees and migrants had to 
purchase a train ticket from the southern to the northern borders of Macedonia for the cost of 
approximately 25 euros: four times more than a Macedonian citizen did. 
Figure 5. Dead and missing persons on maritime routes of irregular migration  
to the EU 1988-2015 (as of 19 April 2015) 
 
Source: Fargues and Di Bartolomeo 2015. 
3.2 Refugee narratives 
The following excerpt is taken from an account made and recorded by Ghazi – a young man in his 
early twenties who left Damascus at the outbreak of the conflict.
13
 Ghazi fled from Lebanon to 
Germany in early September 2015. It took him fewer than two weeks to reach his final destination. 
Before succeeding to move to Germany, he lived in Qabb Elias, a small city in the Beqaa Valley, 
where he volunteered for an NGO that assisted Syrian refugees. These type of stories are very 
important among refugees, who generally triangulate those with other accounts to acquire a better 
understanding of the journey and its challenges. In the story, Ghazi seeks to rehearse every single step 
of the journey: 
All the Syrian refugees have first to go to Turkey. You can reach Turkey by plane from Rafik 
Hariri airport in Beirut to Istanbul airport, Izmir airport or Adana airport, or you can get to Turkey 
by land through Syria. Personally I took a plane from Rafik Hariri Beirut airport to Adana airport. I 
booked the ticket three weeks prior for 180$ then I took an internal flight from Adana to Istanbul 
for 60$. Once you get to Istanbul or Izmir, it is easy to find smugglers to help you reach Greece. 
All you have to do is search Facebook by typing: ‘ways to move to Europe or Germany’ or 
whatever destination you choose, and you will find plenty of pages that can provide you with a 
large number of smugglers’ contacts. Personally, I took a smuggler contact number from a friend 
who had already approached the same smuggler and who had succeeded arriving in Germany. 
When I first called him from Lebanon and told him that I would be in Turkey by the following 
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week, he told me that we would not negotiate over the phone, but to give him a call once I got to 
Turkey to talk about the procedure and the cost. When I arrived in Izmir I called him and we 
[Ghazi and his travel companions] met in a hotel, he told us that a trip to Greece would be 
organized the following day for 1200$ per person and that the price was not negotiable. He met us 
the next day at 3:00pm and accompanied us to buy floating vests. Note that the police are not 
interfering or investigating any refugee, there is some kind of negligence towards the refugees that 
are trying to travel illegally through Turkey. The smuggler took us to buy floating vests and food. I 
believe that the person who was leading us was only an intermediary between the refugees and the 
smugglers; and that we were not in direct contact with the real smugglers.
14
 
At 5:00 pm approximately the intermediary rented us a taxi toward a gathering point where there 
was several buses to transport us discreetly to a second gathering point on the shore, it took us 
approximately two hours to get there, it was in the middle of nowhere, it was an empty area. When 
we arrived at the shore one of the smugglers’ intermediaries provided us with a dingy with a small 
engine that could carry approximately 50 individuals and he pointed to the island that was visible 
to us. He informed us that he had already bribed the coast guard and all we had to do was moving 
toward the island. The dingy was controlled by one of the refugees and this is where refugees are 
left on their own. Those journeys are towards three islands, either Mitilini Island or Chios Island, 
or Samos Island. These islands are widely known for smuggling refugees. In our case, we moved 
discretely to Mitilini Island using the dingy; we were approximately 50 individuals. It took us 2 
hours 15 minutes to get to the island. 
We had heard stories from other refugees that some refugees were identified by the police in the 
sea. In those cases, different scenarios can materialize. If you are captured by the Turkish police, 
you are taken back to Turkey and then delivered to the Syrian police.
15
 Alternatively, if the Greek 
coast guards catch you, they will take you back to the Turkish water and then forced to go back to 
Turkey on your own. Finally, if you are captured by the Greek coast guards, you are taken to one 
of the island mentioned above so you can join other refugees. 
When we arrived at Mitilini Island the locals welcomed us with the presence of the Greek police, 
then we were guided to a gathering point. The interesting thing is that most of the refugees are not 
Syrians, you can find Refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. When we arrived at the 
gathering point, an employee from the Greek government stamped our passport and gave us a 
paper that allows us to stay in Greece for a maximum of three months, it allows us to move freely 
within Greece, but after this period we must leave Greece. Note that there is no way to lose our 
way since we always find refugees on the streets heading the same way to leave Greece. After 
obtaining this paper, we moved to a ship booking office nearby where we manage to book a trip to 
Athens. Some refugees took a plane to Athens. We bought tickets to Athens for 60 Euros per 
person; it took approximately twelve hours by boat to reach our destination. When we reached the 
ship yard we did what all the refugees were doing, we took a bus to Ammonia square and then we 
took a bus toward the border of Macedonia for 70 Euros. 
It took us seven hours to get to the border where we were given a number for each bus in order to 
divide us into groups. We got out of the bus and the police showed us the path that we should 
follow. We walked approximately 500 meters where we found people from UNHCR facilitating 
and organizing the groups on the border, they were distributing food and clothes. Then, each group 
was accompanied by UNHCR people and the police of Greece and Macedonia through the path. 
We kept on walking until we reached a train station with the presence of the Macedonian police 
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and people from UNHCR. They put us on special trains heading to the Macedonia-Serbia borders, 
but we had to pay first 25 Euros per ticket. Note that the police were helping us in order get rid of 
the refugees because they do not want us to stay in their country. 
When we got to the borders of Serbia, we also found the Macedonian police and UNHCR 
facilitated our transit, they distributed food and clothes and, once again, they showed us the 
direction to continue our journey. After walking approximately 500 meters, we saw police from 
Serbia that helped us continue our path to reach a checkpoint where they searched our bags and 
then they guided us once again on the path to reach the first city in Serbia [Presevo]. We reached a 
meeting point where we took a bus to Belgrade for 60 Euros per individual. When we reached the 
bus station in Belgrade, we took a bus to Argos. Note that the Serbian police booked us the bus 
tickets to Argos for 16 euros and note that at this point no one checks our passports and 
identification papers since they are aware that you are just passing through their country.  
When we reached Argos, we were left at a railway near the Hungarian borders – keep in mind that 
during the trip our only concern was the dingy and Hungary, because we heard that in Hungary the 
government is more strict than other countries. At the railway, we walked for 4 km to get to the 
Hungarian borders where we met a police officer that informed us that they were facilitating our 
transit at the borders and that was true. At the end of the railway, we found journalist and UNHCR 
people along with the Hungarian police distributing food and clothes and facilitating the transit of 
the refugees. We waited our turn to jump on a bus, which took us to a train station were we moved 
to the Austrian border for free. Note that the transit was smooth since UNHCR people were 
present, stories had been circulating that at the Hungarian border the police were strict so the 
refugees had to sneak discreetly until they attained a gas station to avoid the Hungarian police; 
here, they would find taxi drivers that smuggled them to Budapest, charging 200 Euros each. Some 
refugees were captured in Hungary and forcibly fingerprinted. This is something that refugees fear 




However, as I said, we were lucky that UNHCR people were present. So, entering Hungary for us 
was easy. When we arrived at the Hungarian-Austrian border, we found that the Hungarian police 
was waiting for us, facilitating our passing. We walked for approximately two kms to attain 
another meeting point where we were provided with food and clothes. We waited for a while for 
the bus then we were moved to Salzburg where they [local authorities] provided for us with 
accommodation for one night. The second day, they took us to the train station where we were 
transported to Munich. Note that all these trips and the night accommodation were provided to us 
for free. When we reached Munich, some of us stayed in Munich, others moved to other cities. 
Personally, I moved to another city in Germany. 
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Figure 6. Illegal border crossing (Macedonia-Serbia) 
Llojan-Miratovac (Macedonia-Serbia), October 2015 
Source: Luigi Achilli. 
 
Figure 7. Syrian refugees in Serbia near the border with Croatia 
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3.3 Syrian refugees and the humanitarian response 
Limited knowledge 
Verbal accounts like the one above make up a large part of Syrian knowledge of the route. The 
accuracy of these stories and the attention to minute details by their narrators reflect the enormous 
importance that this oral knowledge has for people. They provided much of the information needed by 
migrants and refugees about the route, the dangers, and the opportunities that they will face on their 
way to Europe. In this sense, it would be wrong to impute a lack of knowledge to refugees. 
Figure 8. Hungary has constructed razor-wire fences along its borders with Serbia and Croatia 
to prevent the entry of irregular migrants and asylum seekers 
Horgos II, October 2015 
Source: INTERSOS. 
Nonetheless, the stories that circulate among the Syrian community are success stories of those who 
made to Europe. They tell of women and men who successfully reached their destination, and of 
people who, in the end, managed to overcome all the perils that they faced in the route. While there is 
no doubt that stories like these do exist and that they make a strong point convincing an increasing 
number of people to embark on a dangerous journey, they only offer one part of a much more complex 
story. What people hear much less or, perhaps, prefer not to hear are the stories of people who failed, 
those who returned, and those who perished. In other words, Ghazi’s narration is both remarkably 
thorough and overly optimistic. 
It is hardly surprising, thus, that most refugees who we interviewed along the Western Balkan route 
admitted that they did not expect the journey to be such a shattering and dangerous experience. 
Furthermore, relying on information from others making the same journey, Syrians generally mistrust 
any other source of information. This creates obvious problems. for example, in a recent study on the 
current displacement trends of Syrian migrants to the EU, REACH reports how this over reliance on 
word of mouth causes “thousands to travel at once, for example during the night of 17 September 
when more than 5,000 people crossed the border between Serbia and Croatia through fields on either 
side of the Sid-Tovarnik crossing, despite reports of landmines” (REACH 2015). 
The circulation of stories across social media and networks allows refugees to cope with the lack of 
a first-hand knowledge. Situations that would normally expose people to exploitation are bypassed or 
avoided by relying on the advice and stories of those who have preceded them. The sea-journey 
between Turkey and Greece is a case in point. The vast majority of Syrians is aware that the small 
stretch of sea that separates the two states is the most dangerous leg of the trip. Picking the right 
smuggler may be fortuitous and migrants are certainly at the mercy of the smugglers during the 
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journey to Europe. Yet, successfully smuggled migrants operate as pull factors, redirecting the 
prospective clients toward the best service deliverers. 
However, knowledge of the route remains limited, and few refugees have a full awareness of the 
risks entailed in the sea passage. Humanitarian workers providing medical care for asylum seekers 
landing on Greek shores reported several cases of dehydration, shock, and pneumonia from the sea 
journey. Many refugees interviewed upon their arrival in Greece admitted that they were not expecting 
such a dreadful and life-risk experience. This is what happened, for example, to Abu Omar, a man in 
his fifties from Homs in Syria whom we met in the transit camp of Gevgelija, a town located in the 
southeast of the Republic of Macedonia along the country’s border with Greece: “I left Beirut with my 
family [wife and three children] two weeks ago. […] My brother is in Holland, I decided to join him. 
[…]. I knew what the journey to Europe entailed. I knew that the sea was the most dangerous part. I 
didn’t care, though. I used to think ‘even if I die in the sea, I would not care – it is still better than 
living in hell [in Lebanon]’ But now that I did it[the sea-crossing], I would not do it again. You are in 
the middle of nowhere, squeezed in a rubber coffin with other people in your same situation; people 
that – like you – don’t see anything, don’t know if and when exactly you will arrive. It is only fifty 
minutes, but it feels like an eternity. It was hell!” Several refugees have confirmed that this was the 
worst part of the journey. To their voices, we need to add the silence of those whom for wretched 
boats and rough seas did not make it as far as Greece. 
Coordinating the Humanitarian Response 
The very journey that leads to Europe requires a special expertise, adequate social connections, means 
of transport, and a clear knowledge of the route that is difficult to obtain from oral accounts and/or 
Facebook groups alone. This includes legal regulations on migration; the consequences of illegal entry 
in a European country; procedure for family reunification, etc. The increased self-confidence of 
refugees has exposed them to a number of unexpected problems and issues. The proliferation of stories 
and rumours on the relaxation of border controls in the transit countries has also contributed to trigger 
a mass effect that raised the number of migrants fleeing to Europe substantially. This has had serious 
negative repercussions on humanitarian coordination. 
A common refrain among many humanitarian operators met along the route was the lack of 
coordination among local as well as international organizations such as UNHCR. NGO staff, civil 
society, and volunteers working on the “migrant crisis” in transit countries such as Greece, 
Macedonia, and Serbia often lamented the duplication of efforts, the lack of technical skills and tools 
for coordination, and the poor knowledge of the developing situation. Over the course of an informal 
chat with a humanitarian worker of an INGO in Greece, working on the reception of refugees and 
migrants coming to Turkey by sea, the man depicted a quite bleak scenario: “we are supposed to help 
locals to deal with large masses of refugees and migrants landing daily on their shores. But, in truth, 
what we [humanitarian organizations] really do is rather add to villagers’ chaos as much as the 
refugees”. The volunteers working at the Serbian-Croatian border near the town of Šid complained 
about the lack of supervision: “we are doing our best here, but it’s a mess here. We often don’t know 
what to do or how to do it properly, and we don’t have anybody offering supervision. We need to learn 
by doing!” The need for a robust institutional response is especially visible in Lesvos where virtually 
all humanitarian workers and volunteers interviewed lamented the absence of trained professionals, 




26 MPC RR2016/01 
Figure 9. Refugees waiting to cross the border between Serbia and Croatia 
Sid (Serbia), October 2015 
Source: INTERSOS. 
To understand the root causes behind this lack of organization, we need to take into consideration the 
combination of the sheer number of asylum seekers moving along the Balkan corridor as well as the 
nature of knowledge transmitted through their accounts and stories. 
The velocity and immediacy of sharing: this is the nature of refugee stories. Their circulation 
usually allows refugees to keep up – at least in part – with the fast changing scenarios of border 
controls and to learn about the opening of new routes. Emergency assistance provided by highly 
structured humanitarian organizations seems, on the other hand, to travel at a different speed. They are 
often slower to adapt to the sudden and rapid changes in refugees trajectories, and even slower to set 
up an effective coordination system. In this context, sudden border closures and conflicting 
information have resulted in significant confusion not only among the Syrian community but also, and 
especially, in the planning and coordination of the humanitarian response. This was, for example, 
particularly evident when refugees and migrants crammed themselves together at a closed crossing 
point near the Serbian town of Horgos, after Hungary’s decision to close its entire border with Serbia 
on September 15, 2015. First came the shock and confusion of the sudden sealing of the border, then 
people responded to the situation. It took only few days for refugees and migrants to open up a new 
route via the Serbia-Croatian border and to reorganize a steady stream of people into northern Europe. 
It took weeks for the humanitarian community to adapt to the new scenario. 
In this regard, civil-society volunteers were particularly relevant. They shared a modus operandi 
very similar to that of the refugees themselves: they use Facebook and other social media to coordinate 
themselves and divulgate information. A myriad of independent online fundraising efforts sprang up, 
and calls to give or sign petitions mushroomed on Twitter and Facebook. These groups lacked the 
technical competences and resources of other more structured organizations. However, civil society 
volunteers displayed a great capacity for responding to the crisis with immediacy and effectiveness 
that organizations with solid structures and rigid hierarchies seemed to lack.  
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4. Conclusion: The end of the journey or the beginning of new problems?  
A combination of pull and push factors has considerably raised the number of Syrian refugees 
reaching Europe over the past year. Those who left were persuaded that crossing the short, yet 
dangerous, stretch of sea between Turkey and Greece would have signified the end of their quandary. 
This kind of representation is also shared by much of the media and public opinion across the world: 
spotlights often turn on the sea crossing on the Turkish-Greek border. A closer scrutiny of Syrians’ 
trajectories, however, problematizes common assumptions about the refugees’ journey to Europe and 
the call for the need to focus on the last step of that journey: the arrival. 
To begin with, reaching their destination in Europe has not meant the end of problems for large 
numbers of asylum seekers. Their fine understanding of the journey often accompanies a poor 
knowledge of its ending. Of course, refugees may also chose their destination accurately. Aware of the 
Dublin Agreement that stipulates that the country of first contact is responsible for processing asylum 
requests, Syrians carefully avoid being finger-printed by local authorities in countries with poor 
protection and response capacity, and move forward. The country that refugees finally reach depends 
on a number of factors such as social networks and personal expectations. Germany and Sweden seem 
to be the most popular destination, due to the level of assistance and presence of services and support. 
Furthermore, the establishment of social networks in these countries has, in itself, become a pull factor 
for future migrants. 
However, if migrants and refugees are conscious of the normative that define the Dublin Agreement, 
their knowledge of EU reception systems remains quite limited. Encouraged by the stories of their 
friends and relatives, refugees nurture high hopes for what they will find in Europe. In many cases, these 
expectations are dashed. This is the story of Suhad, a young woman from Damascus. When we first met 
her in Turkey, the woman expressed her desire to settle down in Holland. She did not want to go by boat. 
She saw no other option but to buy a fake passport for 1000USD. Upon her arrival in Holland, we heard 
back from Suhad: she was thrilled by the idea of beginning a new life. She had a clear plan in mind: she 
would spend a few days in one of the refugee camps set for Syrians in Holland; then, move outside, 
settle down, and pursue a career as an architect. Two months after, Suhad – still in the camp and with no 
job prospects – told us that was considering leaving Holland and going back to Syria. 
Second, the migrant refugee is not necessarily the weakest party: the journey to Europe may entail 
considerable protection risks for those who stay since family members left behind may not be able to 
depend on the meagre resources left behind anymore. This is the story of Umm Mahmood whom we 
met in the Lebanese town of Majdel Anjar near the borders with Syria. The woman lived with her son 
– a young man in his late twenties – in a rented house, waiting for the day they could reunite with the 
rest of their family. Umm Mahmood’s husband and daughter in law were thousands of miles away in a 
Swedish refugee centre. When they fled to Sweden, they thought that after a few months they would 
be reunited. A year had passed when we spoke. Umm Mahmood and her family left Syria in 2013 
following the chemical attack that occurred in August 2013 in the suburbs around Damascus. They 
found refuge in Lebanon. After a year, the family began thinking about leaving: “life in Lebanon is not 
viable anymore for Syrian refugees”, Umm Mahmood explained to us. Her son and the husband 
originally planned to make the trip together, and then apply for family reunification. However, when 
the son reported some problems with his passport, the husband decided to leave with his daughter in 
law. The choice of leaving with his son’s wife was also explained by the pregnancy of the latter, which 
in their minds would have helped to speed up the procedures for obtaining asylum. Over nearly a 
month, the couple journeyed from Lebanon through Turkey and seven European countries. It cost 
them 8000 USD, or all the assets that they had not already liquidated. Stranded and without any 
resources, Umm Mahmood and his daughter relied on humanitarian assistance and loans, waiting for a 
family reunification that has not as yet turned up. 
It is worth remarking that this part of the study was carried out prior to November’s terrorist attacks 
in Paris. Since then Macedonia, Serbia, and Croatia have begun filtering refugees and migrants leaving 
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many stranded just as winter is approaching. In this challenging context, it is very difficult to provide 
Syrian refugees with durable and sustainable solutions. It is also extremely difficult to discuss risks 
and threats linked to a journey to a third country. However, during their research it emerged that 
humanitarian organizations, as well as policy makers can do more to inform and support Syrian 
refugees who decide to embark on this risky journey. It also emerged that consistent evidence about 
their intentions and reasons for staying and/or leaving can guide programming and advocacy actions in 
a more meaningful way. Against this background, MPC and INTERSOS are committed to continuing 
research and supporting the establishment of a regular coordination mechanism. These might better 
protect those in this current migrant crisis through specific protection programmes, as well as regular 
analyses and assessments. 
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